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Rewards To Continued Work:
The Economic Incentives For Postponing Retirement
ABSTRACT
Using a new data file on pay and pensions, this paper
presents and discusses new empirical evidence on how older
workers' income opportunities change as they age. It also de—
velops a detailed description of private pension structures and
the ways in which pensions reward deferred retirement. The data
imply that the present discounted value of total lifetime income
rises when people postpone retirement, but the size of the
incomeincrement varies with age. The data also show that some
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ThEECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR POSTPONING RETIREMENT
Olivia S. Mitchell and Gary S. Fields
This paper develops empirical measures of the economic incentives
for deferred retirement among older workers. Using a new data file on
pay and pensions, we construct intertemporal budget sets reflecting the
income available to workers at alternative retirement ages. The analysis
explores how continued labor force attachment is rewarded in terms of net
earnings, Social Security benefits, and private pension income.
Twomotivationsguide the research. First, it is important to
understand how workers' income opportunities change with age. Studies of
retirement patterns including our own' and others2 have demonstrated that
these economic rewards influence older workers' decisions to leave the
labor force. Savings decisions, consumption paths, and other economic
outcomes are also responsive to the budget set at older ages.
Unfortunately, data limitations have made it difficult for previous
authors to explore the range of income opportunities available to older
individuals. This paper presents and discusses new empirical evidence
on how older workers' income opportunities change as they age.
It is also important to explore how companies differ in the corn—
pensation packages they offer to older workers. Some authors3 have
suggested that firms use their pension plans to encourage early
retirement, though data on this phenomenon are difficult to obtain.
1Mitchell and Fields (1983), Fields and Mitchell (1982).
2Boskinand Hurd (1978), Burkhander and Quinn (1983), Burtless and
Hausman (1982), Gordon and Blinder (1980), Custman and Steinmeler (1981).
3Lazear (1982).2
The present paper develops a detailed description of private pension
structures and the ways in which they treat prolonged job attachment.
Two main conclusions arise from the analysis. First, the data
show that total net income rises as people defer retirement, but the
size of the income increment varies with age. Second, the data show
that some pension plans encourage early retirement among older workers
but others penalize it. Thus differences in private pension structures
prove to be an important source of variation in income opportunities
across older workers. Our results have implications for researchers
interested in older workers' income patterns and for policymakers who
propose mandating actuarial neutrality in private pension plans.
Section I of the paper views briefly the most important theoretical
features of older workers' income opportunities, and discusses some
general considerations when building an empirical counterpart of the
theoretical budget set, Section II presents our methodology and data,
and Section III presents the findings. Conclusions are collected in
Section IV.
I. Theoretical Considerations
We consider the rewards to continued work in the context of older
persons' retirement decisions. Previous theoretical studies of
retirement behavior1 have identified the individual's problem as
selecting the optimal amount of work to do over the remaining lifetime,
subject to income and time constraints. "Optimal" is defined as the
labor supply path which maximizes intertemporal utility; accordingly,
the goal is to select that retirement age which provides a worker with
his most preferred combination of leisure time and income from among
'For a review see Mitchell and Fields (1982).3
available options. The worker's income constraints are determined by
net earnings available from market work, and net Social Security and
private pension benefits available during retirement. His time con-
straint consists of time remaining until death, which may be allocated
between work and leisure.1
More formally, the worker is postulated to select that retirement
age (R) which maximizes intertemporal utility, the arguments of which
are lifetime consumption (C) and lifetime leisure (RET):
U =U(C,RET);U concave
subject to intertemporal budget constraint with the following structure:
C=PDVY(R)+W —B.
0 0
Inother words, planned consumption equals the present value of dis—
counted income over the remainder of the individual's life (PDVY),
plus wealth at the time of the retirement decision (W), minus planned
bequests (B0). Survival probabilities and pure time preference are
incorporated via a discount factor (r). Both the lifetime utility
function and the income constraint are viewed as stationary over time.
The PDVY component of the older worker's budget constraint depends
on the retirement age chosen. This is because PDVY is composed of three
elements, each of which is a function of R. The present value of
earnings (PDVE) is computed from the age at which the worker begins
planning for retirement (normalized to 0) until R:
PDVE E e.dt
0
The other twocomponentsof PDVY,thediscounted value of Social
Security and pension benefits, also depend on R since they are computed
'We abstract here from retirementoptions involving part—time work or
gradual withdrawal from the labor force; Custman and Steinmeier (1981)
and Burtless and Noffitt (1982) consider these alternatives in some
detail. For the sample of older workers described below, retirement
may be best described as accepting thepensionand leaving the firm
since only a tiny minority ever worked after becoming pensioners.4






PDVPP / PP ertdt
R
Annual retirement benefits are fairly complex functions of
several factors including the worker's retirement age:
SS =f(R,t,F)
=g(R,t,F).
Many firms raise annual pension benefits when the worker defers
retirement to acknowledge the shorter period over which benefits will
be paid; when benefits are just sufficiently larger to offset increased
mortality, the pension structure is termed actuariallyneutral)
As with private pension formulas, Social Security rules also provide a
positive credit as R increases. Social Security and private pension
benefits also depend upon two other variables. The year itself, t,
enters the annual benefit computation because benefits often vary with
time. This would occur in the case of negotiated benefit improvements
in bargained plans, or legislated Social Security formula changes.
Finally, the pension factor (F) is included to allow for Interactions
between benefits and other variables; for example in some pension plans,
pre—retirement earnings are used in the benefit formula.
In addition to the income constraint, an older worker also faces
a total time constraints. By definition, years of retirement leisure
(RET) are equal to the difference between expected lifetime (N) and the
11n the empirical analysis below, we focus on defined benefit plans, i.e.,
those in which benefit amounts are functions of years of service and/or
pay rather than pension contributions. Benefits in such plans need not
be actuarially neutral.5
age at which retirement occurs:
RET= N-It.
Understanding the income—leisure tradeoff facing older workers
Is facilitated by means of Figure 1. This graphs the present value of
income available to the older individual and -the expected retirement
period for all possible retirement ages; the diagram indicates that
for this hypothetical worker at least, income is lowest if he chose to
retire as early as possible, while income would rise substantially if he
remained additional years at his firm. The figure presumes that
deferring retirement is rewarded by ever more income; below we show
empirically that the intertemporal budget set indeed has such a shape.
-
Presentingthe older worker's decision in this way highlights
the similarities between this model and the conventional labor economics
approach to the hours of work decision. Figure 1 also indicates that
the optimal retirement date (R*) is determined in a familiar way:
R* is the age at which the marginal utility of an additional increment
to lifetime income is just offset by the loss in utility from leisure
foregone. While we do not develop comparative dynamics for R* here,
they may be derived in much the same manner as in the cross—sectional
framework
Some features of the intertemporal budget set should be underscored.
First, the older worker's budget set is defined over all possible
retiremetat dates rather than at just one moment in time. A complete
understanding of the rewards for continued work therefore investigate
not just one or two points on the budget surface, but all alternatives.
Second, to be able to compute PDVY at each age, it is necessary to






The Intertemporal Budget Set (BB')
and the Optimal Retirement Date (R*)
67
understand the private pension and Social Security benefit formulas
facing a given worker, since these institutional rules impart structure
to the intertemporal budget set. Third, the income leisure tradeoff
embodies expectations about future income streams and formulas,
inflation rates, mortality rates, and a host of other variables.
These must also be modeled in empirical work.
II. Building the Empirical Intertemporal Budt Set
To construct an intertemporal budget set, we require complete
data on each worker's earnings, private pension benefits, and Social
Security benefits. The data set used in empirical analysis is a sub—
samp].e of the Benefit Amounts Survey (BAS) developed in 1978 by the
U.S. Department of Labor's Pension and Welfare Benefits Program.
The survey consists of a random stratified sample of private sector
pension plans filing reports with the Labor Department as required under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The pension
plans selected for analysis were asked to provide a limited amount of
information on their beneficiaries; data collected at the firm included
birth year, year of retirement, and tenure with the firm for each
sample worker. Individual records were then merged with administrative
data from the Social Security Administration, so that each worker's
file also contained his earnings history from 1951 on.
The sample of workers available for analysis consists of 8,733
men born in 1909 or 1910. This limited age cohort is selected because
by the survey date (1978) virtually all would have been retired, yet
relatively few would have died and therefore been excluded from the
sample.
For the analysis at hand, we must know the rules determining
pension benefits. We constructed such information from union contracts8
and/or summary plan descriptions on file with the U.S. Department of
Labor for 14 defined benefit plans. No larger data set with Information
on both pensions and their beneficiaries is now available; our pension
analysis is therefore an extension of our own previous efforts as well
as those of other analysts, who have generally been limited to an
examination of a single pension plan.1 On the other hand, the sample
of pension plans is still small, and therefore our findings must be
viewed as exploratory rather than representative of pension plans as
a whole.
The plans represented here cannot be identified individually for
confidentiality reasons. We may say, though, that our sample includes
several blue collar plans negotiated with the United Auto Workers,
several other plans in the manufacturing sector, a craft union plan,
and one in the trade sector.
An example of the benefit rules used in a United Auto Workers
plan is given in Table 1 for illustrative purposes. It is evident
that even this apparently simple "years of service" formula turns out
to be quite complex in practice.
1See, for instance, the work of Burkhauser (1979) and Fields and
Mitchell (1982) on the United Auto Workers and Burtless and Hansman
(1982) on Federal government workers.9
TABLE 1.
THE PRIVATE PENSION STRUCTURE IN COMPANY X
The pension structure in Company X is negotiated every three
years and written into a contract with the United Automobile Workers
union (UAW). The plan is non—contributory. The benefit formula
negotiated in th early 1970s, when the workers in our sample were
about 60 years of age and were presumably deciding when to retire,
varied depending on age and/or years of service. To Illustrate,
the following rules applied to an individual who started work at
Company X at age 30:
I. If he retires after age 60, but before age 62:
his pension benefit is $4,800 per year until
• age 62 and $5,400 per year from 62 to 64;
thereafter, it is [$90 x yrs. of service less
(.04 x the difference between the retirement age
and 62)] + $63.60.
ii. If he retires after age 62, but before age 65:
his pension benefit is $5,400 per year until
age 65; thereafter, it Is [$90 x yrs. of service)
+ $63.60.
Iii. If he retires at age 65 or later: his pension
benefit is [$90 x yrs. of service] + $63.60.
Benefits in I and ii are available only after completing 10 years
of service.I0
Theformula given in Table 1 describes pension benefit rules in
effect around 1970, at which time our sample workers were about 60
years of age. But the rules in 1970 would not necessarily have been
appropriate for a worker who waited to retire until, say, l975
In this company, and in the other companies in our study, the pension
formula had been made more generous during the 1960s. In anticipating
what future retirement benefits might be, workers in that company might
reasonably have expected that benefits would be raised in the future as
much as they had been in the past. We look back at union contracts,
the Bureau of Labor Statistics Pension Digest, and other documents to
determine what had been happening. Empirical analysis of changes in
pension benefits over time, for newly retiring workers as well as for
previously retired individuals, reve.aled that pension plans typically
raised benefits in line with inflation for workers not yet retired, but
not for those already retired. Therefore, we-assume that the prospective
retiree would have figured on pre—retirement increases just short of the
inflation rate, but zero post—retirement increases.
The specific pension formula outlined in Table 1 depends only on
age and years of service. To cQmpute pension benefits in other pension
plans, it is also necessary to know what the worker would have earned
had he remained on this job. Earnings information is, of course, needed
directly in considering the intertemporal budget set.
Earnings until retirement are obtained from Social Security
earningshistory data. Earnings in excess of the Social Security taxable
maximumare imputed using a variant of a routine described in Fox (1976).
Earnings after retirement are imputed from previous years' earnings.
Gross earnings are then reduced by income taxes and payroll taxes to
obtain net earnings.11
The other element of the intertempora]. budget set is Social
Security benefits. These are computed based on the Social Security
rules in effect in 1972. We use 1972 benefit rules for. retirement
decisions being made around 1970, because future changes had been
legislated two years in advance. The algorithm incorporates what the
worker might have anticipated had he retired earlier and filed for
benefits when first eligible at age 62, and what he would have received
if he had postponed retiring and filing for benefits until laterages.
As with the projection of future private pension benefits, thisrequires
an assumption about how benefits would have been expected to change over
time. The algorithm incorporates the real growth rate in SocialSecurity
benefits experienced during the 1960s as the best estimate of how real
benefits might have been expected to change during the 1970s.
One limitation of the Social Security computation. should be noted.
It is possible. to estimate only the male's Social Security benefits, not
the spouse's benefits, since marital status information is not available.
In moving from the annual budget set components (all of which are
in nominal dollars) to present discounted values (which are muchmore
informative if expressed in real dollars), several additional assumptions
inust'.be made. Standard practice is followed by discounting each year's
benefits by the probability of mortality at each age, based on survival
rate information for the cohort in question. In addition, future benefits
are deflated by two factors: inflation, and a real discount rate.
Estimated future benefit streams assume continuation of the rate of price
increases prevailing in the early l970s; to discount benefits accruing
in the future, the same nominal rate is used. In addition, a 2% real
discount rate is used to reflect time preference. Confirmatory analysis
with other discount rates produces results virtually identical to those
reported below.12
The foregoing describes the construction of the budget set for
each individual in our BAS file. In the balance of this paper, we
summarize this information by calculating the overall budget set and
its components for a specific "illustrative worker." We do this for
purposes of comparison, since it is useful to derive benefits using
the same basic earnings and job tenure characteristics holding constant
other factors whjch might vary across plans. Nonetheless, this illus-
trative individual should also be relatively similar to actual workers
in the pension plan, since benefit structures are generally constructed
with a relevant salary range in mind. The "illustrative worker" used
below isassigned the mean net earnings and job tenure derived from the
underlying sample described above. The average tenure figure, 26 years,
is compatible with Hall's (1982) recent discussion of lifetime jobs among
males in the U.S. labor force. Others who have computed pension benefits
(e.g., Lazear, 1982, Kotlikoff and Smith, 1982) did not have such infor-
mation, and were thus required to use several different tenure and
salary options to cover most of the possibilities.
III. The Economic Rewards to Deferring Retirement
It will be recalled that two empirical questions guide our
empirical explorations: (1) How do total income profiles change as
workers age?, and (2) How do pension plans reward continued work effort?
Each question is Investigated in turn in this section.
1Readers of our earlierpapers should be alerted to the fact that those
other papers use the actual workers In that company, not the illustrative
worker used here.13
A. The Shape of the Total Income Path
Table 2 displays the elements of the illustrative worker's
intertemporal budget set, expressed in annual terms inthe top panel
and in present discounted value terms in the lower panel.1
Of most interest for the present discussion are the last two
lines on Table 2 (lines II.D and E), which report total PDVY and
marginal changes as retirement is deferred. The following features
of the PDVY stream are noteworthy:
(1) PDVY rises monotonically as retirementis deferred.
This is because at each age earnings plus (or minus)
pension and Social Security accruals exceed the pension
and Social Security benefits foregone. In real terms,
a worker postponing retirement from age 60 to 65 would
roughly double his real income stream.
(2) PDVY rises nonlinearly with age of retirement.
The payoff to working one additional year is highest in
both dollar and percentage terms between ages 60 and 61;
if the same worker deferred retiring between 64 and 65,
his dollar gain would be about $1,400 less, for a marginal
percentage change of 9% instead of 18%.
Therefore the data show that the economic rewards for postponing
retirement are increasing but the gains vary across ages. Previous
studies have not discerned these patterns, because they used data
containing less detail on the components of PDVY.
'Income amounts are reported here only to age 65 since retirement was
mandatory in some plans. Below, benefits for other ages are given in
plans where work beyond age 65 was permitted.14
TABLE 2.
EARNINGS, SOCIALSECURITY AND PRIVATE PENSION INCOME
ATALTERNATIVE RETIREMENT AGES, FOR THE ILLUSTRATIVE WORKER1
If Retirement Occurred at Age:
A. Net Earnings (PDVE):
B. Social Security (PDVSS):
C. Net Private Pension (PDVPP):
D. Total PDVY:
E. Marginal Increases:
7677 15203 22549 29618 36269
28755 29614 31013 32288 33191
18960 19953 19493 19029 18542
55392 64770 73055 80935 88002
8434 9378828578807067
(18%)(17%) (13%) (11%) (9%)
Notes:
'Computations based on pension algorithms devised for fourteen pension plans
and illustrative worker; see text.
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The fact that the intertemporal budget set for older workers
rewards deferred retirement implies that observed income for any
particular retiree is a function of when he chooses to 'retire, rather
than being exogenously given. If one wished to evaluate incomeoppor-
tunities actually available to an already retired worker, one would
have to develop an intertemporal budget set such as that in Table 2
indicating the magnitudes of contingent income flows available at
alternative retirement dates.
The pattern of the budget set also implies that the value of
PDVY (or its component parts) at any one particular age will not be
very informative about the overall shape of the intertemporal income
path. Unfortunately, most data sets other than the BAS contain insuf—
ficient detail on earnings, Social Security, and private pension
benefits, making it difficult to develop the full PDVY path.'
B. The Shape of Private Pension Income Paths
Understanding how firms reward continued work at older ages is
facilitated by Investigating private pension structures. Pension benefits
constitute a fairly significant source of older workers' incomes.
The top panel of Table 2 shows that annual (first year) benefits from
private pensions are sizeable, equalling or exceeding Social Security
payments for all ages but 65 (and are not much less at age 65).
Net private pension income amounts to one—quarter to one—third of after—
tax— earnings for individuals in the sample.2
1Approximations are possible using the Longitudinal Retirement History
Survey; see Fields and Mitchell (1983).
2Previous studies have notcomputed after—tax replacement rates for both
private pensions and Social Security so these figures cannot be directly
compared with others in the literature. We find that the overall
replacement.rate including both pensions and Social Security is between
SO and 60% on average, though in some cases individuals received as much
as 95% of pre—retirement net earnings.16
Still focusing on annual benefits, line I.C. indicétes large
differences ia benefits depending on when the worker retires. An age—60
retiree would on average receive private pension income of about $2,200
that year. If he deferred retirement by one year, the addition to
(nominal) benefits would be on the order of 7%. However, the marginal
pension payoff to an additional year's work is by no means uniform across
retirement ages: for example, benefits at age 62 are lower than for age 61.
This unexpected benefit decline is attributable to pension plan supplements
provided until a retiree attains age 62, the age of eligibility for
Social Security. A reduction is again evident between the ages of 64 and
65; the pension rules thus acknowledge that workers can file for full
Social Security retirement income at age 65, and provide a bridge for
individuals retiring earlier. In general, the marginal pension payoff
to retiring one year later varies quite a lot across retirement ages, a
fact not immediately evident from a cursory review of benefit rules.
Line II.C of Table 2 converts the annual pension benefit figures
into present discounted values in real dollars. Again it is evident
that the reward structure built into private pensions varies for dif-
ferent retirement ages. The iljustrative workers would receive more
in lifetime benefits if he left the firm at age 60 than he would if he
postponed retirement to age 61, despite the fact that annual benefits
are higher at age 61 than at 60. In fact, the annual pension benefits
are incrçased at less than actuarially neutral rates at several ages,
as is evident from computed changes in the present values of lifetime
benefits:
Age60—161—262—363—464—5
Changein PDVPP 0% +5% —2% —2% —2%17
Clearly the structure of lifetime pension income flows very much
affects the economic rewards for continued work.
Present values in Table 2 are averages across fourteen pension
plans, so they conceal potentially interesting differences in company
pension structures. Table 3 splits the sample into two groups: pattern
and conventional plans. Pattern plans are pensions where benefits are
based almost exclusively on years of service with the firm (or occu-
pation, if a craft union). Conventional plans, more common among
non—union firms, determine benefits based on both final salary and
tenure with the firm.
-It.is evident from Table 3 that the overall means obscure some
key differences between the two kinds of benefit structures. Pattern
plans tend to structure their first—year benefits so that they rise
more or less smoothly, reaching a peak at age 64; annual benefits
typicall.y fall for workers deferring benefits beyond that point.
First year benefits in conventional plans operate quite differently,
sincehere benefits for the age—62 retiree are lower than for the worker
leaving one year earlier; itisthis subgroup of plans which produces the
dipin annual benefits found in the overall mean. However, after age 62,
conventional plans tend to provide ever—increasing benefit amounts for
workers postponing retirement up to age 65.
An examination of discounted pension values in these two types of
plans suggests even sharper contrasts. Pattern plans (line IIB) actively
discourage work beyond age60.1 An employee in a pattern plan who defers
retiring until age 65 will in fact receive lifetime benefits about 18%
lower than at age 60! On the other hand, present value streams in
conventional plans are structured so that a worker deferring retirement
'This is similar to the finding reported by Lazear (1982).18
until age 65 receives about 17% higher benefits than if he retired at
60. Thus between ages 60 and 65, conventional pension plans appear to
improve benefits by about the same amount as pattern plans reduce them.
Clearly, the overall incentives differ between the two types of
plans. To see whether marginal incentives are smooth or erratic, changes
in pension present values are computed for each additional year of work:
Change in PDVPP: Age60—161—262—363—464—5
PatternPlans —2% —2% —5% —5% —5%
Conventional Plans +2%+14% +0% +0% +0%
Evidently, pattern plans actively encourage early retirement, whereas
conventionalplans strongly encourage work up to age 62. After age 62,
conventional plans provide a rather flat payoff schedule for additional years'
work; in pattern plans, the slope becomes strongly negative; see Figure 2.
Table 4 disaggregates to the level of the individual plan.
This breakdown of pension plan benefit strictures reveals even more
variability in economic rewards for continued work. These plan—specific
data permit the computation of benefit streams for ages beyond 65 in
cases where continued work was permitted; forms with mandatory retire-
ment are indicated with a dash (—).Thefinal column for each plan
summarizes findings graphically, which is helpful In determining how
benefits change between early and late retirement ages.
This disaggregate investigation of pension plan rules suggests
two conclusions:
(1) Pension plans reward deferred retirement differently from
one company to the next. Pattern plans as a whole, and the
UAW plans in particular, encouraged early retirement by
structuring benefits so they attained a maximum between19
TABLE 3.
NET PRIVATE PENSION AMOUNTS AT ALTERNATiVE RETIREMENT ACES
IN PATTERN AND CONVENTIONAL PLANS'
If Retirement Occured at Age:
I. Annual Net Pension Benefits2 60 61 62- 63 6465
A. Overall Mean $2190 2350 2322 2513 2742 2634
B. Pattern Plan Mean 2653 2760 2907 3059 3214 2626
C. Conventional Plan Mean 1728 1939 1883 2103 2356 2639
II. Present Value of
Pension Benefits
A. Overall Mean $1907018960199531949319029 18542
B. Pattern Plan Mean 247952419223787226172143220275
C. Conventional Plan Mean 147771503617078171501722717243




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Present Value of Private Pension Benefits in
Pattern Plans and Conventional Plans22
ages 60 and 62. Conventional plans are more complex, but
as a rule structured their benefit flows so as to reward
continued work well beyond age 60.
(2) Marginal payoffs to deferred retirement are uneven;
actuarial neutrality across retirement ages is rare.
In our sample, a worker deferring retirement by one year
could bave increased his lifetime pension income flow by
as much as 14%, or reduced it by 5%, depending on the
pension plan in which he worked.
In overview, then, some private pensions reward prolonged work and
others penalize it both in overall and in marginal terms. It is not
true that pensions always discourage work beyond age 60.
IV. Conclusion
The notion of an intertemporal budget set facing older workers
flows from an economic model of choice of retirement age subject to
Income and time constraints. Measuring the budget set empirically
requires computing total discounted income for each available retirement
age. In so doing, it is important to model Social Security and private
pension rules defining benefits available at each age, and in addition
to determine how workers would have expected these rules to change in
the future.
Using a unique new data set known as the Benefit Amounts Survey,
we develop empirical answers to questions: (1) How do workers' total
incomes change as they defer retirement?, and (2) Do private pension
structures reward or penalize continued work at older ages?
The data suggest two important features of the discounted total
income streams (PDVY) facing older workers which have not been noted23
in previous studies. First,PDVY rises monotonically as retirement is
deferred. Second, PDVY rises nonlinearly with age. In general, the
economic rewards for postponing retirement are ever—increasing but the
gains vary depending on the age in question.
The data also point to two new conclusions about the incentive
structures of private pension plans. First, pension plans reward
deferred retirement differently across companies. Second marginal
payoffs to deferred retirement are uneven; actuarial neutrality across
retirement ages is uncommon. Some private pensions reward prolonged
work but others penalize it.
The patterns just noted have implications for both researchers
and policymakers. Analysts interested in modeling and estimating the
determinants of retirement, savings and other economic behavior among
older workers must build and examine the intertemporal budget sets
confronting these individuals as they age. Similarly, Income distri-
bution studies should recognize that actual retirement income among
retirees is determined to a significant degree by workers' retirement
behavior. These considerations highlight the importance of developing
new data sets containing more complete 'information on workers, their
earnings histories, and their company records Including pension system
rules.
The observed differences in pension patterns also have an
Interesting policy implication. Oneproposalthat has received some
attention in policy circles of late is the idea that the federal govern—
inent should mandate pension benefit neutrality. This proposal is
motivated by the belief that pension structures currently encourage
early retirement. It is thought that mandatory pension neutrality24
would result in higher benefits for those continuing to work beyond age
60, thereby encouraging longer workforce commitment. However, our
analysis shows that the actual result depends on the benefit structure
presently available to the covered employee. In pattern plans, the
effect of mandatory neutrality would probably be to cut early benefits
rather than to increase later ones. Though this would affect retirement
ages in the anticipated direction, retirement benefits would be lower
than at present, not higher.
In conventional plans, on the other hand, mandatory neutrality
could conceivably remove the desired incentives currently in place to
defer retirement; such a result would not be consistent with federal
efforts to encourage later retirement. Altering pension reward structures
currently in place could produce other undesirable results as well.
If the current pension benefit patterns are structured in accordance with
firms' perceptions of the relative efficiency of older workers compared
to younger ones, imposing regulatory restrictions would be expected to
increase firms' costs, some part of which would probably be passed on to
workers in the form of lower wages and/or lower pension benefits.
Both the welfare and the efficiency costs of mandating pension neutrality
should be analyzed much more carefully before concluding that such a
policy is desirable.REFERENCES
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